

Mandatory Federal Training: Where Contractors Actually Add Value Above Government-Provided Content

Every cleared employee on a federal contract carries a stack of mandatory training. The DoD Cyber Awareness Challenge, annually. Insider Threat training, annually. Counterintelligence Awareness. OPSEC. Anti-Terrorism Force Protection. Combating Trafficking in Persons. Ethics. Records management. HIPAA on healthcare contracts. A long menu of role-specific requirements layered on top.

Here is the thing about that stack: **the training is the government's**. Most of these courses are delivered through CDSE, JKO, or an agency learning management system. The content is government-designed. The certificate is government-generated. The contractor does not build the course, does not deliver the course, and does not own the platform that hosts the records.

So it is reasonable to ask: where is the value for a contractor here? The training is mandatory, the content is fixed, the certificate is the output. Is there anything beyond record-keeping a contractor can do — or that an outside firm can architect — to add substantive value?

The answer is yes, in three operationally distinct places. And each one is a recurring federal-contract failure mode that contractors regularly absorb as CPARS hits, or worse.

First: the records-defensibility problem

Most contractors handle mandatory training certificates the way most organizations handle any compliance PDF — as attachments to HR emails, eventually filed in personnel folders.

Then DCMA surveillance asks the question: *“Produce documentation that every cleared employee with access to classified information on this contract completed annual Insider Threat training within the past 365 days — sorted by employee, with completion dates and certificate authenticity verifiable.”*

Most contractors cannot satisfy that request within two minutes. Many cannot satisfy it within the inspection day. That is a record class sitting in the merely-stored state on a category where the regulatory expectation is full producibility. The defensibility failure surfaces as a Corrective Action Request at minimum, and on contracts with security implications it can rise to a contract-performance issue.

This is straightforward records-architecture work. The architecture that produces a clean response — every employee in the contract scope, every required course, every currency status, every certificate verifiable, retrievable in seconds — is not difficult to design. It is just rarely built without deliberate attention, because mandatory training is treated as a checkbox rather than as a surveillance-exposed record class. Building that architecture for a cleared contractor with several hundred employees is real work, it is valued, and it immediately retires a specific, recurring category of audit risk.

Second: the pre-task qualification problem

Mandatory training is not just a record. It is the **license to operate**.

An employee whose Insider Threat training has lapsed should not have classified access on the day of the lapse. An employee whose HIPAA training has lapsed should not be in patient data. An employee whose OPSEC training has lapsed should not be reading controlled information. An employee whose Cyber Awareness Challenge is out of currency should not hold privileged network access.

Most contractors discover lapses *during audits* — which is precisely the most damaging moment to discover them, because the lapsed employee has continued exercising privileges they should not have

had. At that point the remediation is not simply to renew the training. It is to document that operational privileges were exercised during the lapse window, and to assess the actual risk that created. On a cleared contract, that can be a security incident requiring formal reporting.

The architecture that prevents this is the integration of currency tracking with access control: the system gates the lapsed employee out of contract work *before* the lapse becomes a finding. That is not a record-keeping exercise. It is an operational risk control — define the data flow between the training-currency system and the access-control system, write the standard operating procedures, and build the surveillance-response playbook for the now-rare lapse exceptions that still slip through. The value is risk reduction with directly quantifiable downside avoided.

Third: the Level 3 / Level 4 distinction — applied even here

This is the wedge most contractors entirely miss on mandatory training, and it is where the framework adds the most distinctive value.

The government's metric for mandatory training is Level 1 and Level 2 — *did the employee complete the course; did they pass the embedded quiz?* The contractor reports completion rates. The surveyor verifies completion records. The CPARS narrative reads: *"the contractor maintained 100% mandatory training compliance throughout the performance period."*

That narrative earns Satisfactory.

The Very Good and Exceptional narrative on mandatory training compliance reads differently. It reads something like: *"the contractor maintained 100% mandatory training compliance and demonstrated behavioral evidence that the training produced operational effect — phishing-campaign click-rates trended downward year-over-year following the Cyber Awareness cycle; the Insider Threat program produced documented surfacings of behaviors of concern that were assessed and resolved appropriately; the OPSEC program produced near-miss reports with documented corrective response; the climate survey showed measurable improvement in psychological-safety indicators following the anti-harassment training cycle."*

That narrative requires the contractor to build behavioral-measurement infrastructure *above* the training stack: phishing-simulation programs that produce trend data, insider-threat reporting metrics, near-miss reporting cultures, climate surveys with consistent instrumentation. None of this is the government's training. All of it is contractor architecture that turns mandatory completion into behavioral-outcome evidence — the Level 3 and Level 4 layer where Exceptional ratings actually live.

A contractor whose mandatory training compliance reads at the Exceptional level *across a 10-year contract* enters every re-compete and every adjacent bid with a past-performance differentiator competitors do not have — on a category competitors treat as a checkbox. Over a multi-year contract, that compounds.

The honest scope

It is worth being precise about what this is and is not.

A consulting firm does not design the mandatory training content — the government does that. It does not deliver the training — employees self-serve through CDSE, JKO, or an agency LMS. It does not build the LMS that hosts the records — commercial tools already exist for that.

What it architects is the three layers *above* the training itself: the records architecture that makes mandatory training compliance demonstrable under inspection pressure; the currency-tracking-plus-access-gating integration that keeps a lapse from becoming a finding; and the behavioral-outcome measurement layer that turns mandatory compliance from a Satisfactory checkbox into an Exceptional differentiator.

That is not record-keeping. It is the architectural work that separates contractors who survive surveillance from contractors who thrive under it — on the one category of federal training where almost everyone assumes there is no value left to add.

What comes next in this series

This is the third of ten posts I'm writing this summer drawn from Reference Volume 5 of the McLean Performance Group practice library — *Federal-Contract Training Defensibility: The Architect's Reference for CPARS-Exceptional Programs*.

The next post, Thursday June 18, steps back to the regime itself: the four pillars — CPARS, DCMA, FAR, and the PWS — that together grade every federal training program, and why a program that performs strongly on three of them and weakly on one performs weakly overall.

If federal training defensibility is on your operational plate — as program manager, proposal lead, contracting officer representative, or senior consulting principal — this series is written for you.

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